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Abstract 
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on the asymmetric 
cost behavior, cost stickiness, in an emerging country, Egypt, which lacks academic 
research on this subject. 
Design/methodology/approach 
This study uses multiple regression analysis to analyze the behavior of selling, 
general, and administrative costs (SG&A) and cost of goods sold (CGS) individually 
and jointly using total costs (TC) for the period 2004-2011 for Egyptian-listed firms. 
In addition, the study compares the cost behavior three years prior to and after the 
application of the corporate governance code in Egypt in 2007.  
Findings 
The results indicate that asymmetric cost behavior is common among Egyptian-listed 
firms as their SG&A, CGS, and TC were found to be sticky during the study period. 
The application of the corporate governance code in Egypt was found to affect the 
nature of SG&A – the behavior of these costs changed from sticky before the code to 
anti-sticky after the application of the code. Moreover, the code was found to affect 
the magnitude of stickiness of both CGS and TC. 
Originality/value 
Greater awareness about cost behavior is important for emerging markets such as 
Egypt in order to protect investors’ interests and satisfy their information needs. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence on cost stickiness 
in Egypt. Moreover, this study provides further evidence on the correlation between 
corporate governance and asymmetric cost behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Cost behavior refers to the way costs respond to change in activity and decision. 
Understanding cost behavior is critical for managers and accountants in order to provide 
and use information to make effective decisions (Maher et al., 2008). Many stakeholders 
require timely and relevant information from management accountants for planning, 
controlling, decision-making, and performance evaluation (Horngren et al., 2012).  
  From management’s perspective, managers need to know how costs behave in order to 
make informed decisions about products, and to plan and evaluate performance (Lanen, et 
al., 2011). From investors’ perspective, investors depend on the published financial 
statements prepared by the management that are based on available information regarding 
the determinants of cost behavior. From financial analysts’ perspective, predicting cost 
behavior is an essential part of earnings prediction (Weiss, 2010). 
Traditional cost behavior models distinguish between fixed and variable costs with 
respect to changes in the level of cost drivers. These models assume that costs behave 
symmetrically; that is, variables costs may change proportionately with changes in the 
levels of cost drivers, while fixed costs remain constant regardless of the changes in the 
levels of the cost drivers.    
Recent studies reveal that costs may behave asymmetrically; that is, costs may respond 
differently to upward or downward changes in activity. Such costs are called sticky costs—
the costs increase more for a rise in the activity than they decrease for a fall in the activity 
by an equivalent amount (Anderson et al., 2003). However, costs that increase less when 
activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount are called anti-
sticky (Weiss, 2010; Balakrishnan et al. 2014). 
Consequently, the cost estimation methods based on the linear cost assumption may not 
be applicable to various areas such as cost analysis, planning, control, and pricing. Many 
traditional techniques such as cost-volume-profit analysis, flexible budgeting, and cost-plus 
pricing may not provide accurate results. Thus, it is critical to consider the stickiness 
behavior when classifying costs in order to retain the firm’s competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. 
The literature assumes that the stickiness behavior may be due to the deliberate decision 
taken by the management when activity declines. The deliberate decision and hesitancy of 
managers to cut slack resources are the key reasons for cost stickiness. Some managers are 
hesitant to cut slack resources when demand declines, thereby implying that firms bear the 
costs of unutilized resources that they should not bear. However, when demand flourishes, 
managers expand resources normally, and thus the related costs increase normally. 
Therefore, the costs’ decrease when demand declines will be lower than the costs’ increase 
when demand increases, resulting in sticky costs. Thus, managers’ hesitancy leads to sticky 
costs, which leads to the question: Why do managers hesitate to cut slack resources when 
demand declines, while they do not hesitate to hire more resources when demand increases? 
Anderson et al. (2003) explain that managers may be hesitant to adjust resources when 
they feel that the demand decline is temporary. Moreover, managers believe that the 
adjustment costs of cutting slack resources are higher than the costs of retaining these 
resources during the short period of demand decline. Therefore, from management’s 
perspective, it is beneficial to deliberate until they are sure that the demand decline is 
permanent and then adjust the resources downward. If demand recovers, managers do not 
have to bear the additional adjustment costs of retiring slack resources and then re-hiring 
them. Therefore, managers prefer to wait until they are sure about the demand change.  
In other words, managers may delay cutting slack resources when demand declines 
because they make a trade-off between adjustment costs of retiring slack resources and 
operating with the additional costs of slack resources. If managers believe that the demand 
decline is temporary, they delay the decision to cut slack resources; however, managers 
expand the resources normally when demand increases, which leads to sticky cost behavior. 
This provides evidence regarding managers’ behavior when they need to increase or 
decrease committed resources that results in adjustments to the incurred costs. Thus, 
managers may be hesitant about cutting resources when sales decline. 
The main objective of this paper is to extend prior studies on sticky costs by empirically 
exploring the stickiness behavior in one of the Middle East countries, Egypt. In this regard, 
this study examines the cost stickiness for the most actively traded Egyptian-listed 
companies during 2004–2011. Thereafter, the study seeks to investigate the nature and 
magnitude of cost stickiness by comparing the cost behavior for two periods—from 2004–
2006, before the application of the Egyptian Corporate Governance (CG) code in 2007, and 
from 2008–2010, after the application of the code.  
The findings indicate that asymmetric cost behavior is prevalent in the Egyptian listed 
firms as Selling, General, and Administrative costs (SG&A), Cost of Goods Sold (CGS), 
and Total Costs (TC) were found to be sticky during the entire study period from 2004–
2011. However, the extent of cost stickiness was 0.18, 0.47, and 0.44 for SG&A, CGS, and 
TC, respectively. The findings indicate that asymmetric cost behavior is prevalent even after 
the application of the CG code in Egypt in 2007. However, the code was found to affect the 
nature of the SG&A and the extent of stickiness of CGS and TC. SG&A changed from 
sticky prior to the application of the code to anti-sticky after the application of the code. 
Both CGS and TC remained sticky even after the application of the code, but the extent of 
cost stickiness was found to be significantly higher after the application of the code.  
     We examine a sample of firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) that may 
be special to examine. EGX is one of the oldest stock exchanges around the world. EGX 
was established in 1883 and 1903 in Alexandria and Cairo, respectively. At that time, EGX 
was considered the fifth largest market in the world (Desoky and Mousa, 2012). Since 1991, 
Egypt adopted a comprehensive reform program to privatize state owned firms and promote 
the widespread stock ownership in a movement towards capitalization.  
     During the study period (2004-2011), EGX and the Egyptian- listed firms have witnessed 
essential reforms, rapid developments, and higher trading activity that make these firms 
special to examine. In 2005, the first Egyptian CG Code was issued in light of OECD 
guidelines. In 2006, the executive rules of CG were issued to be applied on all listed firms 
in EGX. In 2007, these rules were actually applied on all listed firms as a part of listing 
requirements. Consequently, the number of listed firms has been declined significantly by 
more than 100% from 435 in 2007 to 213 in 2011. According to the 2011 EGX annual 
report, the trading values have increased by more than 12 times from 42.3 billion in 2004 to 
529.6 billion in 2008. However, the trading values have decreased to 448.2, 321, and 148 
billion in the years 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively, due to the 2008 financial crisis and 
the Egyptian Revolution In January 2011.  
    On the other hand, the privatization reforms create mixed ownership structures for many 
Egyptian-listed firms. Ownership structures of some firms may consist of managerial, 
governmental, institutional, employees and individual investors together. 
    Consequently, the recent applying of CG in Egypt and the rapid economic developments 
in EGX, in addition to the mixed ownership structures of the Egyptian-listed firms increase 
the motivation of such study. Investigating cost stickiness in Egypt may be of special 
interest, since Egypt is an emerging country that lacks such research.  
The study of the cost behavior of Egyptian companies is of significance for a number of 
reasons. First, awareness regarding cost behavior, especially the stickiness behavior, is 
important in emerging markets like Egypt in order to protect investor’s interests and satisfy 
their information needs; this will enable investors to interpret firms’ financial reports and 
forecast their operating and stock performance accurately. Second, extending prior studies 
in different contexts helps to document whether similar stickiness behavior is observed for 
the Egyptian listed companies. Third, the study of the effect of the CG system on stickiness 
behavior adds to the academic research on the Egyptian CG.  
     The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
formulates the study hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the study methodology. Section 4 
presents the data analysis and the study results. Section 5 presents the study’s conclusions, 
implications, limitations, and recommendations for future research.  
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Formulation 
Literature Review 
One of the first studies that defined and examined cost stickiness was that by Anderson 
et al. (2003). The study labels costs as sticky when they increase more than they decrease 
for an equivalent change in activity. Anderson et al. (2003) examine the behavior of SG&A 
using data for 7,629 listed firms in the US during the period 1979–1998. They find that 
SG&A are sticky and increase by 0.55% for a 1% increase in sales, but decrease by 0.35% 
for a 1% decrease in sales. Further, cost stickiness increases during the economic growth 
periods because managers are optimistic about the demand change. They also find that the 
larger the assets and labor intensity, the greater is the cost stickiness. 
Medeiros and Costa (2004) provide empirical evidence on cost stickiness by analyzing 
a sample of 198 Brazilian firms for the period 1986–2003. Their results demonstrate that 
SG&A increase by 0.59% for a 1% sales’ increase and decrease by 0.32% for a 1% decrease 
in sales. Further, the cost stickiness increased gradually as the authors aggregated data for 
two, three, and four years, thus indicating that the extent of cost stickiness is greater over 
longer periods.   
He et al. (2010) examine the cost behavior for a sample of 1,802 Japanese firms for the 
period 1975–2000 and find evidence on cost stickiness in Japan. Their results indicate that 
SG&A are sticky and increase by 0.59%, but decrease by 0.45% for a corresponding 1% 
change in sales. Moreover, the study finds evidence that the economic situation affects the 
cost behavior—SG&A were found to be very sticky before the 1990 stock market collapse 
in Japan, but less sticky in the period after the collapse. 
Weiss (2010) examines whether the asymmetric behavior of SG&A and CGS influences 
analysts’ earnings predictions through investigating a sample of 44,931 industrial firm 
quarters for 2,520 US- firms during 1986-2005. Findings indicate that firms with stickier 
cost behavior have less accurate analysts’ earnings predictions than firms with less sticky 
cost behavior. Findings also indicate that investors seem to consider the sticky cost behavior 
when forming their beliefs about the firms’ value, especially with respect to total cost rather 
than the stickiness of cost components.  
Further, Porporato and Werbin (2012) introduce empirical evidence on cost stickiness 
in the banking sector. They examine three samples of banks from three different countries, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, for the period 2004–2009. Their results indicate that TC 
increase by 0.60%, 0.82%, and 0.94%, and decrease by 0.38%, 0.48, and 0.55% for 1% 
change in sales for the samples of Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, respectively; this indicates 
different degrees of cost stickiness in the three samples.  
Moreover, Dierynck et al. (2012) investigate whether the managerial incentives to meet 
or beat the zero earnings benchmark influence the labor cost behavior in a total sample of 
51, 826 firm-year observations of private Belgian firms during the period 1993-2006. The 
findings indicate that managers meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark increase 
labor costs to a smaller extent when activity increases, but decrease labor costs to a larger 
extent when activity decreases, which makes labor costs take a more symmetric cost 
behavior form. Managers of these firms were found to focus on firing employees who are 
relatively low cost to fire. However, managers of other firms, who do not face significant 
earnings benchmark pressure, were found to limit the employees' dismissals, which makes 
labor costs take a more asymmetric cost behavior form.  
Kama and Weiss (2013) examine the influence of incentives to meet earnings targets 
on resources-adjustments and the ensuring cost structures. The study examines a sample of 
97,547 firm-year observations for 11,758 different firms during the study period 1979-2006. 
The findings indicate that when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings 
declines, or to meet financial analysts' earnings forecasts, managers accelerate downward 
adjustment of slack resources for sales’ decline, which mitigates the cost stickiness extent. 
Further, Banker and Byzalov (2014) provide a comprehensive framework of 
asymmetric cost behavior and global evidence on cost stickiness.  The study uses data for 
all countries in the Global Compustat that have at least 2,000 valid observations during the 
period 1988-2008. The total sample size is 315,967 firm-years across 20 countries. The 
findings present new comprehensive evidence that asymmetric cost behavior is a pervasive 
global phenomenon, where operating costs were found to be sticky for 16 countries out of 
20. The study also examines some recent claims about the invalidity of some studies' 
findings and concludes that these claims are groundless.  
One recent study, Ciftci et al. (2015), examines whether financial analysts incorporate 
information on cost stickiness and cost variability in predicting earnings. The results show 
that analysts “coverage to the average” in recognizing both cost stickiness and cost 
variability, resulting in substantial and systematic earnings forecast errors. Authors find also 
that incorporating of available information on cost behavior in earnings’ predictions leads 
to larger errors in unfavorable scenarios than in favorable ones.  
Another recent study, Venieris et al. (2015), examines the stickiness of SG&A and the 
potential correlation between cost stickiness and intangible investments measured by 
organizational capital in a sample of 55,769 firm-year observations of US-listed firms 
during 1979-2009. Findings indicate that SG&A behavior is asymmetric and that SG&A in 
firms with high organizational capital exhibit a sticky cost behavior, while SG&A in firms 
with low organizational capital exhibit anti-sticky behavior. Further, findings indicate that 
firms with high (low) levels of R&D capital exhibit SG&A cost stickiness (anti-stickiness).  
Few studies have focused on the impact of the stringency of CG systems and legislation 
on cost stickiness. For example, Calleja et al. (2006) provide a comparative study that 
examines the stickiness of operating costs in four countries with different CG systems—the 
UK, the US, France, and Germany. Both UK and US firms are operating under a common-
law system of CG, while both French and German firms are operating under a code-law 
regime of CG. The results reveal that the stickiness of operating costs for the French and 
German firms is greater than that of the UK and US firms. The authors attribute this to the 
differences in the CG systems. They argue that due to the common-law system of CG, both 
UK and US firms are subject to stricter external scrutiny and have a corporate aim of profit 
maximization, which results in lesser cost stickiness. However, German and French firms 
are less subject to the market pressure of corporate control due to the system of CG in these 
countries.  
Another important study is that by Chen et al. (2012) who examine the influence of CG 
on cost asymmetry. They expect that strong CG will reduce the level of cost stickiness closer 
to the optimal level of cost response. On examining the SG&A behavior for a sample of 
5,278 US listed firm-year observations for the period 1996–2005, they argue that effective 
monitoring discourages managers from excessively increasing SG&A when demand rises 
and encourages managers to respond normally and cut slack resources when demand 
declines. The authors find a positive correlation between the agency problem, expressed as 
empire-building incentives, and the extent of cost asymmetry. Moreover, they demonstrate 
that this positive correlation is less prevalent in the strong CG sub-sample as compared to 
the weak CG sub-sample, thereby indicating that strong CG alleviates asymmetric cost 
behavior.  
      Further, Banker et al. (2013) examine the impact of strictness of employment protection 
legislation on the adjustment costs, and thus, the cost behavior. They examine a large sample 
of 128,333 observations for 15,833 firms located in 19 OECD countries for the period 1990–
2008. They emphasize that the extent of cost stickiness differs according to the level of 
strictness of the country-level employment protection legislation. In other words, stricter 
employment protection legislations restrict the ability of firms to cut slack labor resources 
when demand declines, which in turn increases the cost stickiness. Further, the extent of 
cost stickiness was found to be greater in countries with stricter labor legislations.  
In summation, we find some gaps in the cost stickiness literature. First, we find no study 
that addresses the cost stickiness behavior in Egypt to date. Second, there is paucity of 
studies that examine cost stickiness in the context of CG, although many studies argue and 
find that cost stickiness is a result of managerial interventions. Accordingly, the study key 
questions are: 
 
Q1: Is the behavior of costs for Egyptian-listed firms asymmetric (either sticky or anti-
sticky)? 
Q2: Does the behavior of costs for Egyptian-listed firms remain asymmetric even after 
the application of the CG code? 
 
Hypotheses Formulation 
 
Firstly, we argue that the reasons that lead costs to behave asymmetrically, such as the 
managers’ deliberate decisions toward the resources adjustments when the demand changes 
(Anderson et al. 2003), could exist in any business environment including the Egyptian one, 
therefore the study first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The behavior of costs for Egyptian-listed firms is asymmetric. 
 
Secondly, the literature argues that managerial behavior is a main reason of cost stickiness 
(e.g. Anderson et al. 2003), and thus, CG could affect the cost stickiness magnitude through 
affecting the managers’ behavior (e.g. Chen et al. 2012). However, we do not believe that 
CG could affect cost stickiness for the following reasons. (1) Since the demand changes 
frequently, it is not easy for managers to respond to each day demand change. The board of 
directors or audit committee members, as CG mechanisms, will not compel managers to 
respond to each day demand fluctuation. (2) Further, board and audit committee members 
may not be concerned with decisions made by managers that make costs behave 
asymmetrically. We argue that those members will not monitor each decision that affects 
cost behavior. (3) The managers’ decisions on adjusting or not adjusting the resources when 
the demand changes often seem normal, and managers have the ability to persuade board 
and audit committee members by usefulness of their decisions. (4) Asymmetric response of 
managers to the equal demand change may be beneficial to the firm performance and value. 
For example, when the demand declines, managers may decide not to retire highly skilled 
employees, since they are deemed intellectual capital. This decision may cause costs to 
behave sticky; however, this decision is in the sake of firm. Therefore, board or committee 
members cannot blame managers for such decision, even if it makes costs behave sticky. (5) 
Managers may see that the demand decline is temporary and there is no need to retire the 
slack resources. Managers think that the costs of operating with slack resources may be lower 
than costs of retiring these resources and rehiring them again. This decision may cause costs 
to behave asymmetrically; however, no one can blame managers for this decision, since it 
seems a rational decision in the sake of the firm.  Accordingly, the board and audit 
committees’ members as examples of CG mechanisms may not affect the cost stickiness 
Therefore, the study second hypothesis is: 
 
 H2: The behavior of costs for Egyptian-listed firms remains asymmetric even after 
the application of the corporate governance code. 
 
  3. Methodology  
  3.1 Sample 
The study examines the stickiness behavior of the most actively traded Egyptian listed 
companies for the period 2004–2011. The Egyptian Stock Exchange classifies listed 
companies into 11 sectors. The financial and banks sectors were excluded from the sample 
due to differences in the standardized financial reports. The remaining 9 sectors are 
represented by at least one actively traded company in the sample  
Table (1) summarizes the initial and final sizes of the study’s main samples and sub-
samples. To investigate the impact of the application of the CG code in Egypt in 2007, the 
study considers the three-year period prior to the application of the code (2004–2006) and 
that after the application (2008–2010).The study makes a comparison between the two 
periods to document whether the application of the CG code in Egypt has an impact on the 
cost stickiness behavior of Egyptian listed companies. 
We follow some selection criteria followed by related prior literature. First, we exclude 
observations with missing data on costs or revenues. Second, we discard observations if 
costs exceed revenues for the current year. Third, following Cannon (2014), we discard 
extreme observations where the value of the standardized residuals of any observation is 
more than the absolute value of three. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
3.2 Variables Measurement and Study Model 
     The literature shows that many proxies are used to examine asymmetric cost behavior. 
Anderson et al. (2003), Medeiros and Costa (2004), He et al. (2010), Balakrishnan et al. 
(2014), and Chen et al. (2012) use SG&A as proxy. Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) 
and Nicola and Paolo (2013), among others, use CGS as proxy. Calleja et al. (2006) and 
Banker et al. (2013), among others, use operating costs as proxy. Some studies such as 
Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) and Porporato and Werbin (2012) use TC as proxy. 
However, this study uses three proxies for cost, SG&A, CGS, and TC, due to study 
limitations.  
     Thus, this study replicates the model by Anderson et al. (2003) that uses SG&A as proxy 
for cost and sales revenue as proxy for activity. Further, this study replicates two models by 
Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) that use CGS and TC as proxies for costs and sales 
revenues as proxy for activity. Thus, the three models used in this study are: 
 
Model (1): 
Log {SGAit/SGAit-1} =β0+β1Log{Salesi, t/Salesi, t-1}+β2DecDummyLog{Salesi, t/Salesi,t-1) + Σ 
 
Model (2):      
Log {CGSit/CGSit-1} =β0+β1Log{Salesi, t/Salesi, t-1} +β2DecDummyLog{Salesi,t/Salesi,t-1) + Σ 
 
Model (3): 
Log {TCit/TCit-1} =β0+β1Log {Salesi, t/Salesi, t-1} + β2DecDummyLog{Salesi,t/Salesi,t-1) + Σ 
 
Where: 
     SGAit refers to the SG&A of firm i during the year t; SGAit-1 refers to the SG&A of firm 
i during the year t-1; CGSit stands for CGS of firm i during the year t; CGSit-1 stands for CGS 
of firm i during the year t-1; TCit stands for TC in the current year and is the sum of SG&A 
and CGS, as measured by Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003); TCit-1 stands for TC of the 
prior year; Salesit refers to sales of firm i during the year t; Salesit-1 refers to sales of firm i 
in the prior year; DecDummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the current year net 
sales are less than the prior year net sales, and equals zero otherwise.  
 
4. Data Analysis  
      This study uses quantitative research methods based on secondary data. The primary 
variables used in our analysis are SG&A, CGS, TC, and net sales. Further, data for all these 
variables are obtained from either annual reports or the websites of Egyptian-listed firms 
for the period 2004–2011. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table (2) presents descriptive information about annual revenues, SG&A, CGS, and TC 
for the complete 8-year samples. The mean value of SG&A as a percentage of sales revenues 
is 11% (median = 6%, standard deviation =13%), which is lower than the ratios of 26% and 
24% reported by Anderson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2012), respectively. The mean 
value of CGS as a percentage of sales revenues is 61% (median = 67%, standard deviation 
= 26%), which is comparable with the mean value of 63.77% reported by Subramaniam and 
Weidenmier (2003). The mean value of TC as a percentage of sales revenues is 67.57% 
(median = 74.05%, standard deviation = 24.92%) as compared to 88.2% reported by 
Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003). Porporato and Werbin (2012) reported mean values 
of 79.01%, 69.05%, and 87.42%, for Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, respectively.    
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis Results 
4.2.1 Existence of Cost Stickiness 
     For multivariate analysis, we estimate the three models by running Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). Table (3) shows the regression results of SG&A, CGS and TC models. The 
analysis finds that the three models are statistically significant at p < 0.001; Adj. R2 = 0.24 
and F-ratio = 81.06 for the SG&A model, adj. R2 = 0.67 and F-ratio = 425.48 for the CGS 
model, and adj. R2 = 0.55 and F-ratio = 234.35 for the TC model.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
     Regarding the SG&A model, Table (3) shows that the estimated value of B1 is 0.35 (t = 
11.53), which indicates that SG&A increase by 0.35% for a 1% increase in sales revenues. 
The estimated value of B2 is -0.18 (t = -3.05), which supports the hypothesis of sticky costs. 
The combined value of B1 and B2 is 0.17, which indicates that SG&A decreased by about 
0.17% for a 1% decrease in sales revenues. Both B1 and B2 are significant at 1% (p-value = 
0.001). Our findings support H1, which indicates that Egyptian listed companies exhibit 
stickiness behavior. These results are consistent with many prior studies such as Anderson 
et al. (2003), Mederios and Costa (2004), Balakrishnan et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2012), 
and Dierynck et al. (2012).  
     Regarding the CGS model, Table (3) demonstrates that the estimated value of B1 is 0.87 
(t = 26.51), which indicates that CGS increases by 0.87% for a 1% increase in sales 
revenues. Further, the estimated value of B2 is -0.47 (t = -7.21), which again supports the 
hypothesis of sticky costs. The combined value of B1 and B2 is 0.40, which indicates that 
CGS decreases by 0.40% for a 1% decrease in sales revenues. Both B1 and B2 are significant 
at 1% (p-value = 0.001), which provides additional evidence on cost stickiness behavior. 
These results are consistent with Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) who find evidence 
on stickiness of CGS for large samples of firms from different industries. Subramaniam and 
Weidenmier (2003) find that CGS is sticky when revenues change by more than 10%.  
      We provide some explanations for stickiness of CGS. First, the raw materials cost is a 
main component of CGS. Suppliers regularly induce managers to order large quantities at 
lower costs; this discount reduces the costs of raw materials per unit than was predicted by 
the cost/volume linear regression model. Further, the purchase of large quantities increases 
the inventory intensity. Prior studies argue and find that inventory intensity increases the 
costs stickiness. For example, Subramniam & Weidenmier (2003, 17) state, "Inventory 
intensity increases the stickiness of SG&A and CGS costs in manufacturing, merchandising, 
and service firms.” Second, labor cost is also a main component of CGS. When the demand 
declines, managers may decide to retain the highly skilled employees, since they are deemed 
intellectual capital, managers may not be able to rehire them again when the demand 
recovers.  Further, learning curves explain that labor costs are more likely to reduce 
gradually, since learning improves efficiency and productivity, and thus reduces the unit 
cost. Accordingly, CGS could be a sticky according to the behavior of its cost components. 
     Regarding the TC model, Table (3) shows that both coefficients B1 and B2 are 
statistically significant at 1%; B1 is positive, and B2 is negative, which is consistent with the 
cost stickiness hypothesis. Moreover, the estimated value of B1 is 0.83, which indicates that 
when demand increases by 1%, TC increases by 0.83%. Further, the sum of both B1 and B2 
values is 0.39, indicating that when demand decreases by 1%, TC decreases by 0.39%, 
which provides evidence on cost stickiness of TC. Moreover, the extent of TC stickiness in 
the current study is 0.44%, but that found by Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) is 0.08% 
and by Porporato and Werbin (2012) are 0.22%, 0.82%, and 0.94% for the study’s three 
samples. 
     To summarize, this study provides empirical evidences on the stickiness behavior of 
costs in the Egyptian business environment, where SG&A is found to be sticky to the extent 
of 0.18%, CGS is found to be sticky to the extent of 0.47%, and TC is found to be sticky to 
the extent of 0.44%. These empirical results support the study’s first hypothesis.  
 
4.2.2 Cost Behavior before and after the Egyptian CG Code 
     To test hypothesis H2, the study runs the three models again for comparing between two 
periods. The first period covers three years prior to the application of the CG code (2004–
2006) and the second covers three years after the application of the code (2008–2010).  
 
SG&A Model 
      Table (4) presents the results obtained by using SG&A as a proxy for costs, before and 
after the application of the code. First, the results for the period before the application of the 
CG code are as follows. The estimated value of B1 is 0.41 (t = 7.87), which indicates that 
SG&A increased by 0.41% for a 1% increase in sales revenues. The estimated value of B2 
is -0.37 (t = -3.08), which supports the hypothesis of sticky costs before the application of 
the code. The combined value of B1 and B2 (B1 + B2) is 0.04, which indicates that SG&A 
decrease by about 0.04% for a 1% decrease in sales revenues. Both B1 and B2 are significant 
at 1% (p-value = 0.001).  
     The results for the period after the application of the CG code are as follows. The 
estimated value of B1 is 0.10 (t = 2.23), which indicates that SG&A increase by 0.10% for a 
1% increase in sales revenues. The estimated value of B2 is 0.18 (t = 2.36), which indicates 
that costs are anti-sticky after the application of the code. The combined value of B1 and B2 
(B1 + B2) is 0.28, which indicates that SG&A decrease by about 0.28% for a 1% decrease in 
sales revenues. Both B1 and B2 are significant at 5% (p-value = 0.05).  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
      These findings provide additional support to the hypothesis that SG&A stickiness 
behavior exists even after the application of the CG code in Egypt. However, the behavior 
of the costs has changed from sticky before the code to anti-sticky after the code. After the 
code, the SG&A were found to decrease more when sales revenues decrease than increase 
when sales revenues increase by an equivalent amount. Moreover, this behavior indicates 
that applying the CG code mitigates the stickiness behavior by transforming the costs’ 
behavior from sticky into anti-sticky.  
     One explanation for this lies in the rigid regulations of the CG code. Another explanation 
may be the pessimistic view of the Egyptian companies during the period after the 
application of the code that witnessed the 2008 financial crisis. This is indicated by the 
decrease in sales revenues for most Egyptian listed companies in the period after the 
application of the code. Banker et al. (2013, 2014) highlight that managers may be more 
pessimistic when they expect sales revenues to decline, leading to anti-stickiness behavior.  
      Our results are consistent with those of Calleja et al. (2006) who find that cost stickiness 
in the UK and US firms is less than the cost stickiness in the French and German firms. 
They attribute this difference to the different CG systems applied in these countries. Further, 
our results are consistent with those of Chen et al. (2012) who find that strong CG alleviates 
the extent of cost stickiness. Moreover, Chen et al. (2012) argue that strong CG may reduce 
the level of cost stickiness closer to the optimal level of cost response, since strong 
monitoring systems lead managers to respond normally to demand changes; consequently, 
costs behave normally and do not exhibit a sticky behavior.   
      To conclude, in general, our findings support the stickiness behavior of SG&A before 
and after the application of the code; however, the nature of cost stickiness has changed 
from sticky to anti-sticky, which may be attributable to the application of the CG code. 
Thus, our findings support H2 that states that stickiness behavior persists even after the 
application of the CG code.  
  
CGS Model 
       The results are different when CGS is used as a proxy for costs. In Table (5), for the 
period before the application of the CG code, the estimated value of B1 is 0.86 (t = 28.56), 
which indicates that CGS increase by 0.86% for a 1% increase in sales revenues. The 
estimated value of B2 is -0.18 (t = -2.19), which supports the cost stickiness hypothesis 
before the application of the code. The combined value of B1 and B2 is 0.68, which indicates 
that CGS decreases by about 0.68% for a 1% decrease in sales revenues. The coefficient B1 
is significant at 1%, and B2 is significant at 5%. To conclude, the results confirm the 
stickiness of CGS during the period before the application of the code.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
      For the period after the application of the CG code, the estimated value of B1 is 0.60 (t 
= 8.48), which indicates that CGS increases by 0.60% for a 1% increase in sales revenues. 
The estimated value of B2 is -0.29 (t= -2.79), which supports the hypothesis of sticky costs 
after the application of the code. The combined value of B1 and B2 (B1 + B2) is 0.31, which 
indicates that CGS decreases by about 0.31% for a 1% decrease in sales revenues. Both B1 
and B2 are significant at 1% (p-value = 0.001). These findings support H2, which again 
provides strong evidence on the existence of stickiness behavior after the application of the 
CG code. However, the extent of cost stickiness has increased from 0.18 before the code to 
0.29 after the application of the code.  
    One explanation for this is the managers’ deliberate intervention in the resources 
adjustment process when demand changes, which is a form of real earnings management. 
Cohen et al. (2008) conclude that effective monitoring mechanisms through the 
implementation of a strong CG system reduce opportunities for accounting earnings 
management and direct managers towards real earnings management tools. Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) and Gunny (2010) indicate that real earnings management and accruals-
based earnings management are negatively correlated. To summarize, we find that after the 
application of the 2007 CG code in Egypt, cost stickiness increased and this may have driven 
managers to engage in real earnings management. However, providing empirical evidences 
on managers’ engaging in real earnings management is not a concern of this study. 
  
TC Model 
     The results obtained by using TC as proxy for costs are similar to those obtained by using 
CGS. Table (6) shows that for the period before the application of the CG code, both 
coefficients B1 and B2 are statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. The estimated 
value of B1 is positive (0.80) and of B2 is negative (-0.17), which supports the cost stickiness 
hypothesis before the application of the code. The table shows that for the period after the 
application of the code, both B1 and B2 are statistically significant at 1%. Further, the 
estimated value of B1 is positive (0.87) and of B2 is negative (-0.62), which also supports 
the cost stickiness hypothesis after the application of the CG code. 
  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
      The TC analysis results support the second hypothesis that cost stickiness behavior 
persists even after the application of the CG code. Moreover, the results indicate that the 
extent of cost stickiness increased from 0.17 before the code to 0.62 after the code, which 
implies that the code has affected only the extent of cost stickiness. Further, these results 
are similar to those of CGS—the extent of stickiness of both CGS and TC was found to 
increase after the application of the code, however the extent of TC stickiness (0.62) was 
greater than that of CGS (0.29).  
     Since the increase in stickiness of TC after the application of the code is similar to the 
results for CGS, we propose the same explanations for the TC behavior before and after the 
code. We propose that managers’ intervention in the resources adjustment process is a kind 
of real earnings management that is expected to increase after the application of the CG 
system; Cohen et al. (2008) find that managers engage in real earnings management instead 
of accounting earnings management after the application of CG. We argue that applying the 
CG code in Egypt may direct managers towards real earnings management and increase 
their interference in the resources adjustment process. Thus, we find that TC are stickier 
after the application of the CG code. 
     Finally, while the nature of the SG&A was found to change from sticky to anti-sticky 
after the application of the code, the nature of both CGS and TC was found to remain sticky. 
However, the extent of CGS stickiness increased from 0.18 before the code to 0.29 after the 
code, while the extent of TC stickiness increased from 0.17 before the code to 0.62 after the 
code. These results provide empirical evidence that support this study’s hypotheses. First, 
the costs for the Egyptian-listed firms were found to respond asymmetrically to demand 
changes—SG&A, CGS, and TC exhibited a sticky behavior during the entire study period. 
Second, cost stickiness persisted even after the application of the CG code, which is 
consistent with the study second hypothesis. SG&A were found to be sticky before the code 
and anti-sticky behavior after the code, while both CGS and TC were found to be sticky 
before and after the code. However, the extent of both CGS and TC stickiness increased 
after the application of the code. 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
      Balakrishnan et al. (2014) suggest that focus on firms within a narrowly defined industry 
is one of the three ways to potentially reduce the influence of cost structure and economic 
climate in the study of sticky costs as such firms presumably have similar cost structures 
and scale economies. Consequently, we conduct additional cross-sectional analysis to 
provide further evidence on the stickiness behavior for Egyptian listed companies. We run 
the three models for 9 sectors out of 11 sectors classified by the Egyptian stock market in 
2011, after excluding the banking and financial sectors.  
 
SG&A Model  
     Table (7) illustrates the results of the SG&A model. Except for the industrial, and 
tourism sectors, the SG&A for all the Egyptian listed sectors was found to behave 
asymmetrically. The coefficient B1 for the industrial sector was insignificant, and the 
coefficient B2 for the tourism sector was insignificant, which rejects the cost stickiness 
hypothesis. In addition, the results indicate that all the other sectors exhibit anti-sticky cost 
behavior, except the real estate sector that exhibits sticky cost behavior. Thus, the anti-sticky 
behavior seems to be dominant. However, this behavior is not supported by many prior 
studies. These results are consistent with Balakrishnan et al. (2014) who find evidence on 
anti-sticky cost behavior for 3 of 25 industries. Finally, the cross-sectional analysis provides 
additional evidence on the asymmetric behavior of SG&A for the Egyptian listed firms. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
CGS Model      
     Table (8) shows the results of the cross-sectional analysis of CGS. The table illustrates 
that the results for three sectors, industrial, textiles, and real estate, are insignificant; the 
remaining six sectors exhibit asymmetric cost behavior. Moreover, the food and mining 
sectors exhibit anti-sticky behavior, while the remaining four sectors exhibit sticky 
behavior. These results are consistent with the agency theory that supports the deliberate 
decision of the managers of Egyptian companies to fulfill self-interest through the sticky 
cost behavior. Further, Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2003) examine stickiness for some 
sectors separately and find that CGS is sticky for manufacturing, financial, and service 
firms. To conclude, the CGS results provide evidence on the asymmetric cost behavior for 
six of the nine examined sectors. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
TC Model      
     Table (9) exhibits the results of the cross-sectional analysis of TC. Only the results of 
the industrial and textiles sectors are not statistically significant; the remaining seven sectors 
show significant results. Further, the table shows that the TC of five sectors (construction, 
chemicals, real estate, telecommunication, and tourism) exhibit sticky behavior—all their 
B1 coefficients are positive and statistically significant, and all their B2 coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the cost stickiness hypothesis. 
In contrast, the TC of both food and mining sectors were found to be anti-sticky. The results 
of TC indicate that asymmetric cost behavior is prevalent in the Egyptian listed firms, which 
is consistent with this study’s first hypothesis. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
        To conclude, the cross-sectional analysis provides additional evidence on the 
asymmetric cost behavior for the Egyptian listed firms for the three examined costs (SG&A, 
CGS, and TC). However, this asymmetric behavior differs across sectors and costs. 
 
5. Results and Implications  
 
The results show that cost stickiness is prevalent in the data of the Egyptian-listed firms. 
Further, the cross-sectional analysis shows that stickiness is prevalent in majority of sectors. 
We find that SG&A, CGS and TC behave asymmetrically during the entire study period 
2004-2011, consistent with prior studies, such as Anderson et al. (2003), Medeiros and 
Costa (2004), He et al. (2010), Weiss (2010), Porporato and Werbin (2012), and Banker and 
Byzalov (2014).  
     Further, the results show that the Egyptian governance code may affect the cost stickiness 
nature and extent, but may not mitigate its magnitude. The results show that SG&A behavior 
changed from sticky behavior before the CG code into anti-sticky after applying the CG 
code in 2007. However, both CGS and TC remained sticky after the application of the CG 
code, but their stickiness magnitude increased. However, these results disagree with those 
of Calleja et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2012) that CG systems could alleviate the cost 
stickiness magnitude.  
     Moreover, the study results confirm the arguments of the asymmetric cost behavior 
theory as presented by Banker and Byzalov (2014), those of the deliberate decisions’ 
hypothesis as presented by Anderson et al. (2003), and those of resources-adjustment costs 
theory as explained by Anderson et al. (2003) and Baumgarten (2012).  
     The implications of cost behavior are of primary interest not only to management 
accountants (Weiss, 2010), but also to investors, analysts, governance regulators, 
researchers, and managers. The study results leave important implications for all these 
parties. First, for investors and market analysts, they should take into consideration that cost 
behavior is not always linear as assumed by the traditional cost model. Therefore, they 
should undertake earnings prediction cautiously. Second, management accountants should 
take into consideration the sticky cost behavior when undertaking the cost estimation and 
allocation and when making the budgets, since these techniques depend on the traditional 
cost model that assumes that costs behave linearly with cost drivers. Third, the governance 
authorities should recognize that governance could affect the nature and extent of cost 
stickiness; therefore, they should provide more effective governance rules that mitigate the 
cost stickiness. Fourth, for researchers, this study provides empirical evidence on cost 
stickiness from an emerging market and evaluates the effect of governance code on cost 
behavior. Finally, for managers, they should adjust the resources normally as a response to 
the sales change, as possible as they can, to avoid a higher degree of cost stickiness, 
otherwise, they should provide acceptable justifications for their response to the sales 
changes, and should tell management accountants of their resources adjustments decisions 
that are likely to make costs behave sticky.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusions, Implications, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
   This study seeks to extend the results of the extant research by examining whether (1) 
costs behave asymmetrically in the Egyptian business environment and (2) cost behavior 
differs before and after the application of the CG code in Egypt in 2007. Moreover, the study 
explores the stickiness behavior at many levels. First, the study examines if the stickiness 
behavior of costs is dependent on revenue changes for the most actively traded Egyptian 
listed companies during 2004–2011. This analysis involves using SG&A and CGS as 
proxies for costs, individually and jointly. The results indicate that all the examined costs, 
SG&A, CGS, and TC, exhibit sticky behavior; that is; they increase more than they decrease 
when demand changes by an equivalent amount. 
     Second, the study investigates and compares the stickiness behavior for two periods: 
before the application of the CG code (2004–2006) and after the application of the CG code 
(2008–2010). The reason for this comparison is to demonstrate if there are any changes in 
the stickiness behavior during these two periods. The results of this analysis indicate that 
nature of SG&A changes from sticky before the code to anti-sticky after the code. In 
addition, the CGS and TC exhibit sticky behavior both before and after the application of 
the CG code; the magnitude of both CGS and TC stickiness increased significantly after the 
application of the code.     
     Third, the study examines the stickiness behavior for different sectors in Egypt. 
Examining each industry separately provides greater insights into the cost behavior and 
different impacts on the magnitude of stickiness (Subramaniam and Weidenmier, 2003). 
The cross-sectional analysis supports the stickiness behavior of SG&A and CGS 
(individually and jointly) for the Egyptian listed firms. However, stickiness is a feature of 
certain industries and this asymmetric behavior differs across sectors and costs. The study 
illustrates that stickiness is not prevalent in all sectors. 
     The study’s results provide some implications for both researchers and practitioners in 
Egypt. First, for researchers, this study extends the previous studies by examining the 
stickiness behavior in a developing country, Egypt. In addition, this study is one of the 
studies that combines the perspectives of management and financial accounting that 
encourages researchers to exploit this multi-disciplinary approach in examining various 
research topics. One such research topic is exploring the relationship between the stickiness 
behavior for Egyptian listed companies and earnings management. Second, for 
practitioners, it is more beneficial to consider sticky costs when estimating the average 
amount of change in costs due to a unit change in the activity driver in order to avoid either 
underestimation or overestimation of the responsiveness of costs to increases or decreases 
in activity. This may aid the managements of Egyptian companies in making precise 
decisions based on accurate cost analyses.  
An important limitation of this study is the use of a comparison approach to examine the 
impact of CG on cost behavior where the findings may be due to circumstances other than 
the application of the CG code. Moreover, no CG variable is examined in this study. Further, 
it would be more beneficial if incorporated the governance compliance levels in the study 
models; however, we did not find any data on governance compliance levels in the Egyptian 
emerging market during the study period. Another limitation is the small sample size used 
as compared to the large samples of the other related studies. 
     Future research may examine the determinants of sticky costs in addition to the CG 
variables that are expect to influence the cost behavior in the Egyptian context. Further, it 
may be useful to study the consequences of sticky cost behavior by investigating whether 
the stickiness behavior has an impact on the firm value of the listed Egyptian companies. 
Further, in the cost accounting area, studying the effect of sticky costs on standard costs 
tools may add more value to the existing research. 
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